A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system by Gunn, Lachlan J. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
2.
27
09
v3
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
0 M
ay
 20
14
A directional wave measurement attack against the Kish key distribution system
Lachlan J. Gunn,∗ Andrew Allison,† and Derek Abbott‡
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The University of Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
The Kish key distribution system has been proposed as a classical alternative to quantum key
distribution. The idealized Kish scheme elegantly promises secure key distribution by exploiting
thermal noise in a transmission line. However, we demonstrate that it is vulnerable to nonidealities
in its components, such as the finite resistance of the transmission line connecting its endpoints.
We introduce a novel attack against this nonideality using directional wave measurements, and
experimentally demonstrate its efficacy. Our attack is based on causality: in a spatially distributed
system, propagation is needed for thermodynamic equilibration, and that leaks information.
The Kish key distribution (KKD) system, based on
Kirchhoff’s laws and Johnson noise (KLJN) [1] has
been proposed as a classical alternative to quantum
key distribution (QKD) [2]. Eschewing expensive and
environmentally-sensitive optics, it can be implemented
economically in a wider variety of systems than QKD.
FIG. 1. We determine the forward- and reverse-travelling
waves in this idealized KKD system. Practical systems would
include low-pass filters and instrumentation that do not affect
the steady-state signal. The mean-squared voltages 〈V 2a (t)〉
and 〈V 2b (t)〉 are proportional to the resistances Ra and Rb re-
spectively. We perform our analysis in terms of the reflection
coefficients ΓA and ΓB.
The KKD system is claimed [1] to derive unconditional
security from the second law of thermodynamics—the
idea being that net power cannot flow from one resistor
to the other under equilibrium.
An idealised KKD system is shown in Figure 1. Al-
ice and Bob each apply a noise signal to a line through
a series resistor. The voltage on the line is unchanged
if the terminals of Alice and Bob are swapped; if the
mean-square voltages applied by Alice and Bob are pro-
portional to Ra and Rb respectively then no average
power flows through the line, and in the ideal case
an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot determine which end has
which resistance [1, 3]. If Alice and Bob randomly
choose their resistances—resulting in corresponding noise
amplitudes—to be either Rh or Rl, three possibilities
avail themselves: both choose Rh, both choose Rl, or
one chooses Rh and the other chooses Rl. In this third
case, Alice knows the value of her own resistor, and so
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can deduce Bob’s resistor via noise spectral analysis, and
vice-versa. However, an eavesdropper lacks this knowl-
edge, and so in the ideal case Alice and Bob have secretly
shared one bit of information.
It has been claimed [4] that transmission line theory
does not apply to the the KKD system when operated
at frequencies below fc = ν/(2L), where L is the trans-
mission line length and ν the signal propagation velocity,
because wave modes do not propagate below this cutoff.
We demonstrate that this is not the case by construct-
ing a directional wave measurement device that is then
used for a successful finite-resistance attack against the
system. The position that frequencies below fc do ac-
tually propagate is also supported by the fact that, at
low frequencies, a coaxial cable is known to only sup-
port TEM modes—these modes are known to have no
low frequency cutoff [5, p. 358]. An exception occurs
when the two ends of the line are held at equal potential;
only standing waves possessing a frequency that is an
integer multiple of ν/(2L) can fulfill these boundary con-
ditions [6, p. 31]. However, the the KKD system differs
in allowing arbitrary potentials to appear at the ends of
the line, and so does not support standing waves at the
frequency of operation.
Several attacks against the KKD system exist, how-
ever none thus far have been shown experimentally to
substantially reduce the security of the system [7].
The first attacks, proposed by Scheuer and Yariv [8],
rely upon imperfections in the line connecting the two
terminals; the first exploits transients generated by the
resistor-switching operation, while the second exploits
the line’s finite resistance. The former is foiled by the
addition of low-pass filters to the terminals [9], while the
latter was shown to leak less than 1% of bits [7, 9] in a
practical system.
An attack by Hao [10, 11] instead focuses upon imper-
fections of the terminals; inaccuracies in the noise tem-
peratures of Alice and Bob create an information leak.
However, it was demonstrated [7, 11] that noise can be
digitally generated with a sufficiently accurate effective
noise temperature to prevent this attack from being use-
ful in practice.
A theoretical argument has been made by Bennett and
Riedel [12] that no purely classical electromagnetic sys-
tem can be unconditionally secure due to the structure of
2Maxwell’s equations. It is argued that the upper bound
on secrecy rate by Maurer [13] must be zero because
of the locally-causal nature of classical electromagnetics,
and so an eavesdropper can perfectly reconstruct the key
with the aid of a directional coupler. Kish, et al. [14]
responded that a nonzero secrecy rate is unnecessary in
practice, provided it can be achieved in the ideal limit.
We begin our attack by analyzing the system in Fig-
ure 1 to determine the forward- and reverse-travelling
waves through the transmission line. Let us denote the
equivalent noise voltages of Alice and Bob Va(t) and Vb(t)
respectively, and the waves injected onto the line V ′a(t)
and V ′b (t). These are related by
V ′a(t) =
1
2
(1− ΓA)Va(t) (1)
V ′b (t) =
1
2
(1− ΓB)Vb(t). (2)
Noting that the mean-squared thermal noise voltage is
〈V 2〉 = 4kTBR, we find that〈
V ′a
2
〉
= kTBZ0(1 − Γ
2
A) (3)〈
V ′b
2
〉
= kTBZ0(1 − Γ
2
B). (4)
As the transmission line in the KKD system is short—
and so the forward- and reverse-travelling waves are equal
throughout the line except for a loss factor α—we may
write the left- and right-travelling waves at Bob’s and
Alice’s ends of the line respectively as
V+(t) = V
′
a(t) + αΓAV−(t) (5)
V−(t) = V
′
b (t) + αΓBV+(t) (6)
and so
V+(t) =
V ′a(t) + αΓAV
′
b (t)
1− α2ΓAΓB
(7)
V−(t) =
V ′b (t) + αΓBV
′
a(t)
1− α2ΓAΓB
. (8)
We may write this in matrix form vd(t) = Avi(t) and so
find the covariance matrix C = ACiA
t of the directional
components:
C =
kTBZ0
(1− α2ΓAΓB)
2
[
1− α2Γ2AΓ
2
B + (α
2 − 1)Γ2A αΓA(1− Γ
2
B) + αΓB(1− Γ
2
A)
αΓA(1 − Γ
2
B) + αΓB(1− Γ
2
A) 1− α
2Γ2AΓ
2
B + (α
2 − 1)Γ2B
]
. (9)
When the line is lossless and so α = 1, Eqn. 9 is invariant
under permutation of ΓA and ΓB , and so the covariance
matrix provides no information on the choice of resistors.
However, when α < 1 this property fails to hold, allowing
the choices of ΓA and ΓB to be determined from the
distribution of (v+, v−).
A directional coupler separates forward- and reverse-
travelling waves on a transmission line [15]. We have
constructed a similar device using differential measure-
ments across a delay line, shown in Figure 2.
Consider the d’Alembert solution [5, Eqn. 7.7] to the
wave equation in a medium with propagation velocity ν,
v(t, x) = v+
(
t−
x
ν
)
+ v−
(
t+
x
ν
)
. (10)
The forward-travelling component v+(τ) differs from the
reverse-travelling component v−(τ) in the sign of its spa-
tial argument. We use this to our advantage by comput-
ing the linear combinations
∂v
∂t
− ν
∂v
∂x
= 2
dv+
dt
(11)
∂v
∂t
+ ν
∂v
∂x
= 2
dv−
dt
, (12)
yielding the forward- and reverse-travelling waves as we
desire. All that remains, then, is to determine ∂v/∂t and
∂v/∂x.
The time derivative ∂v/∂tmay be determined digitally
from sampled values of v(t). The spatial derivative is
approximated as being proportional to the voltage across
a short delay line, shown in Figure 2.
FIG. 2. The analog frontend of the directional wave measure-
ment device. Buffering, offset, gain control, and clamping are
not shown. An instrumentation amplifier is used to measure
the voltage across a 1.5m length of coaxial cable, providing
an estimate of ∂v/∂x. After offset and gain adjustments, the
signals are simultaneously sampled by the 12-bit ADCs of an
STM32F407 microcontroller.
After digitisation, we high-pass filter the signals V and
Vx in order to remove any DC offsets or mains interfer-
ence. The signals are then combined to produce the left-
3and right-travelling waves. The time-derivative ∂v/∂t
can be approximated by a difference operator, however
in order to accommodate for the unknown propagation
velocity and delay line length, common-mode leakage
into Vx, and losses in the delay line, we instead use a
first-order least-mean-squares (LMS) adaptive filter [16]
for initial calibration. A signal source is applied to one
port and the other is terminated; this produces a right-
travelling wave on the line, but none travelling to the left.
The left-travelling output V− is used as an error signal
for the LMS filter, suppressing any contribution from the
right-travelling wave.
FIG. 3. The digital signal processing of the directional wave
measurement device, implemented on an STM32F407 micro-
controller. Offset removal is not shown. A least-mean-squares
filter is used at startup to determine the necessary filter co-
efficients; a signal is applied to one port while the other is
connected to a terminator, and the filter coefficients adjusted
to force V− = 0. Filter updates are disabled once the apparent
reflection coefficient becomes sufficiently small.
The real part of the reflection coefficient, seen looking
out of the right port, is computed by a cross-correlation
between left- and right-travelling waves. When this falls
below 0.01, calibration is declared complete and filter
updates cease. After calibration, we validate the system
by configuring it as a reflectometer. Open and shorted
measurements are made, yielding reflection coefficients
of +1 and −1 respectively. The reflection coefficients
of several resistors are also measured, again yielding the
expected values.
We have described the implementation of a direc-
tional wave measurement device using differential mea-
surements across a delay line. While we might measure
the power travelling in each direction in order to deter-
mine the resistor configuration, the distributions to be
distinguished are very similar, resulting in a relatively
large bit-error rate (BER) as was shown in [9]. However,
comparison of the variances of v+ and v− is suboptimal.
We derive an improved test using Bayesian methods and
demonstrate that the two cases can be far more easily
distinguished.
Knowing the covariance matrices of v+(t) and v−(t)
for each hypothesis, we may use Bayes’ theorem [17] to
determine the probability of each configuration. Let C =
0 and C = 1 refer to the events that (Ra, Rb) = (Rh, Rl)
and vice-versa, respectively. Then,
P [C = 0|v+ ∩ v−] =
P [v+ ∩ v−|C = 0]P [C = 0]
P [v+ ∩ v−]
(13)
=
1
2p0(v+,v−)
1
2p0(v+,v−) +
1
2p1(v+,v−)
(14)
=
1
1 + p1(v+,v−)
p0(v+,v−)
, (15)
where p0(·, ·) and p1(·, ·) are the multivariate Gaussian
PDFs for the measurements from each respective config-
uration.
The most probable state, then, is given by the
maximum-likelihood estimator [17]
Cˆ =
{
0 if p0(v+,v−) > p1(v+,v−)
1 if p0(v+,v−) < p1(v+,v−).
(16)
The comparison is more conveniently made in terms
of the log-likelihood, which for the n-variate zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix Σ is given
by [18, p. 250]
log pΣ(x) = log
[
1
(2pi)
n
2 |K|
1
2
e−
1
2
x
TΣ−1x
]
(17)
= −
1
2
log |Σ| −
n
2
log (2pi)−
1
2
x
TΣ−1x. (18)
Noting that Σ is positive-definite, we may write it in
terms of its Cholesky decomposition Σ = KKT , and so
= −
1
2
log |Σ| −
n
2
log (2pi)−
1
2
∥∥K−1x∥∥2 .
(19)
Only the final term depends upon the data, and there
only through the total power of a group of signals K−1x
formed by linear combinations of the measured waves.
It should be noted that this estimator differs substan-
tially from that proposed in [8], which makes a sim-
ple comparison of variances. The measured variables in
our case are collected simultaneously and so exhibit the
heavy correlations of Eqn. 9. With these correlations, the
likelihood-ratio test provides far better performance than
the difference in the variances of the marginal distribu-
tions would suggest. However, if the voltage and current
measurements are considered separately, as in [7, 9] where
only the marginal distributions of each measurement are
computed, these correlations vanish and so the estimator
described in Eqns. 16 and 19 has substantially less power.
The distribution of test statistics is shown in Figure 4
for a loss of 0.1 dB. The presence of correlation causes
the distributions of test statistics to differ substantially,
where otherwise they would be almost indistinguishable.
The results of simulation for various values of loss are
shown in Figure 5. A pair of white noise processes are
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FIG. 4. Log likelihood-ratio test statistics for each permu-
tation of resistors in Eqn. 9, as in Eqn. 19 with scaling-
factors omitted. The dashed lines correspond to the case
where (Ra, Rb) = (Rl, Rh), and the solid lines to (Ra, Rb) =
(Rh, Rl). Parameters are Rl = 1 kΩ, Rh = 10 kΩ, Z0 = 50Ω,
and α = −0.1 dB. In Figure 4a the covariances are set to zero,
and so Eqn. 16 reduces to a simple power comparison. The
distributions are almost indistinguishable. In Figure 4b, the
measurement variables are drawn from a correlated bivariate
distribution having the same marginal variances, and are far
more distinguishable. In either case, as losses increase and so
the variances of the measurements and transformed measure-
ments respectively differ more greatly, the two distributions,
which mirror each other about zero, become increasingly as-
symmetric and so far more distinguishable.
generated, Fourier-transformed, and the undesirable fre-
quency components removed. They are combined ac-
cording to Eqn. 8 to produce the voltage waves, and the
maximum-likelihood estimator is used to determine the
resistor configurations. This demonstrates that our es-
timator can differentiate the two distributions without
the unreasonably large sample sizes that were previously
thought necessary [9].
Having demonstrated our attack in simulation, we pro-
ceed to experimental validation of the model. The es-
timation of ∂v/∂x is key to the operation of the de-
vice, however the synthesis provided above is dependent
upon a wave-based analysis of the system. We there-
fore measure experimentally the frequency response of
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FIG. 5. Simulated eavesdropper bit-error-rate as a function
of averaging time, for line attenuations of 0.01, 0.1, and 1.0
decibels respectively from top to bottom. The link parame-
ters are RL = 1kΩ, RH = 1kΩ, Z0 = 50Ω. Note that the
averaging time is expressed in multiples of 200 µs. This is
the correlation time (i.e. reciprocal of the system bandwidth)
so that the results are bandwidth independent. Transmission
lines with greater loss are more susceptible to attack, with
substantial attenuations providing little protection. The er-
ror rates are estimated from a sample size of 105, with 2σ
error bars shown.
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FIG. 6. Measured frequency response of the ∂v/∂x estimation
circuit in Figure 2. The derivative increases linearly with fre-
quency, as would be expected from the d’Alembert solution to
the wave equation. The response H(0) at DC is subtracted in
order to remove the effect of wire resistance, yielding the ‘com-
pensated’ curves above. After this correction we see ∠H(f)
approximating the expected +90◦ constant phase response,
slightly drooping due to the limited frequency response of the
system.
the electronically-estimated ∂v/∂x, shown in Figure 6,
with a wave travelling in a single direction in order to
verify that our analysis is appropriate.
We expect to see a magnitude response linear in fre-
quency and a constant +90◦ phase response. This agrees
with the experimental results shown in Figure 6, vali-
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FIG. 7. Measured eavesdropper bit-error-rate as a function
of averaging time and line attenuation. The line is approxi-
mately 2m in length and has a loss of less than 0.1 dB. From
top to bottom, 0 dB, 0.1 dB, and 1 dB of additional attenua-
tion provided by inserting an in-line attenuator at one end of
the line.
dating our analysis, and demonstrates that the signal
through a short transmission line indeed propagates as a
wave, in contradiction to the theoretical claims of [4].
We have implemented the attack described above, us-
ing resistances Rl = 1kΩ, Rh = 10kΩ, and a coax-
ial transmission line of characteristic impedance Z0 =
50Ω. The voltage sources are produced by an arbitrary
waveform generator, producing independent normally-
distributed voltages over a frequency range of 500Hz–
5500Hz. The bandwidth B = 5kHz results in an approx-
imate correlation time of B−1 = 200µs [19]. Each con-
figuration is set and the covariance matrices from Eqn. 9
are measured during the setup phase. Resistor config-
urations are randomly selected as would be the case in
an operational system, and the log-likelihood ratios are
computed for the measured values of v+ and v−. Their
differences are thresholded to compute (16), providing
the bit-error rates in Figure 7. Even modest losses al-
lowed almost all bits to be determined correctly, showing
that the technique simulated in Figure 5 can be applied
in practice.
By applying a threshold to the likelihood ratios, we
may estimate the agreed bits and so determine the error
rate of Eve. We see that even with the minuscule losses of
the test system, Eve can acquire a substantial proportion
of the agreed bits.
The technique above exploits imperfections in the
KKD implementation; while it might be theoretically
possible to counter this attack by reduction of losses as
proposed in [9], the reduction of losses substantially be-
low 0.1 dB ensures that this will be infeasible for all but
the shortest or slowest of links.
This raises the question of why our attack should suc-
ceed where existing finite-resistance attacks have failed.
The attack of Scheuer and Yariv [8] considered only the
variances of the measured variables. Our attack exploits
the large correlation between waves in each direction; the
estimator used above partially removes this common sig-
nal, increasing the ability to distinguish between the two
cases statistically.
We have demonstrated an attack against the KKD key
distribution system that exploits losses within the con-
necting transmission line. The attack has been shown
experimentally to correctly determine more than 99.9%
of bits transmitted over a 2m transmission line within 20
correlation times. As this attack requires that losses be
reduced to a fraction of a decibel in order to maintain a
meaningful level of security, modifications to the system
will be necessary in order to produce a secure link of any
significant length and bitrate.
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